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1. Introduction  
This paper examines how individuals respond to climate change risks relative to what is 
predicted by formal models of choice, and proposes strategies for aiding and improving 
decisions. We focus on two areas where consumers are reluctant to incur the costs of 
mitigation and adaptation measures that will increase their welfare, as illustrated by the 
following two climate change response measures. 
Adopting Energy Efficient Products and Other New Technologies.   Individuals 
underinvest in measures that will reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions even when the 
expected discounted benefits of these measures exceed their expected costs (Creyts, 
Granade, and Ostrowski 2010). There has been a reluctance by many consumers to 
purchase energy-efficient appliances and switch from incandescent to CFL bulbs where 
the economic benefits in the form of lower electricity bills greatly exceed the extra costs 
of these products (Hausman 1979; Gately 1980; Mills and Schleich 2008).
2
 This 
difference between the optimal and actual level of energy consumption has been termed 
the energy efficiency gap (Hirst and Brown 1990; Jaffe and Stavins 1994). In addition, 
few homeowners have invested in new technologies such as solar panels even when the 
cost of installing these technologies are less than the expected discounted savings in 
energy costs over time as indicated by recent studies (Denholm et al. 2009; Drury et al. 
2013). 
Investing in Adaptation Measures to Reduce Flood-Related Losses.   Few homeowners 
residing in areas subject to flood-related losses from hurricanes and riverine flooding 
voluntarily invest in measures that reduce future losses, even when they would find these 
measures to be cost-effective (Kunreuther, Meyer and Michel Kerjan 2013).  In a survey 
of over 500 residents in coastal counties during Hurricane Sandy in 2012, a great 
majority of respondents indicated doing at least one storm preparation activity, such as 
buying batteries and food and water reserves.  But those were mainly short-term 
preparation actions that required limited effort.  Many fewer households undertook more 
substantial protective measures.  For instance, fewer than half of storm shutter owners in 
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 Some individuals prefer incandescent to CFL bulbs because they light up immediately and provide better 
lighting. 
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New York State who responded to the survey actually installed them to protect their 
windows before the hurricane (Meyer et al. 2013). 
When individuals take steps to mitigate GHG emissions by investing in energy 
efficient products and/or new technologies, they are having a positive impact on the 
global community.  Residents who undertake adaptive measures to reduce losses from 
future flood-related disasters are reducing the need for federal disaster relief 
expenditures. Although we will not be examining the social welfare impacts associated 
with mitigation and adaptation measures, this factor plays a role in government decisions 
to encourage individuals to undertake specific actions to deal with climate change.
3
  
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 characterizes the decision processes of 
four hypothetical families, two of whom are concerned with whether to invest in new 
technologies that will reduce their use of carbon-based fuel, and two of whom are 
considering whether to elevate their homes to reduce future flood damage. Using these 
examples we delineate features of descriptive models of choice with respect to decisions 
to undertake investments that reduce future costs, and highlight how these 
characterizations of behavior differ from normative models of choice.  
Section 3 discusses the concepts of intuitive and deliberative thinking and how 
they apply to investing in adaptation or mitigation measures related to climate change. 
Section 4 explores potential modifications to the choice environment, and other policy 
actions, that may affect consumer choices in mitigating or adapting to climate change and 
its impacts. The concluding section summarizes the paper and suggests directions for 
future research.  
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 In this regard, Borenstein (2012) emphasizes the need to develop cost estimates of the associated 
environmental and non-environmental externalities of existing technologies for generating electricity so 
that one can compare the use of coal and gas against renewable energy technologies—wind, solar and 
biomass.  
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2.  Individuals’ Decision Making Processes  
The following four hypothetical and stylized examples based on actual accounts highlight 
the challenges in incentivizing individuals to invest in mitigation and adaptation 
measures that reduce the impacts of climate change:  
 
2.1 Mitigation Actions  
The Watt family in Santa Barbara California is considering whether to spend $15,000 to 
install solar panels on their home that promise to reduce their average annual energy 
expenditures by somewhere between $3,000 and $6,000 over their current system. Solar 
panels will allow them to lock in long-term electricity rates and protect them from large 
increases should on-grid utility prices soar due to possible climate change repercussions. 
The family compared the cost of solar panels with their expected savings in energy 
expenditures over the next several years, and concluded that it was not worth spending 
the money on the solar panels. Furthermore, they are concerned with the negative impact 
that a $15,000 investment would have on their limited budget during the year. They are 
unconcerned about the magnitude and impact of climate change in the next 20 years, and 
so decide not to invest in the solar panels now.  
The Winter family in Juneau, Alaska experienced a 45-day power failure in 2008, 
after a large avalanche destroyed a section of the main hydroelectric transmission line in 
the city.  Backup generators using diesel fuels were the only source of electricity causing 
electricity prices to increase by 500 percent. To save money, the family reduced their 
energy consumption by taking measures such as turning down the heat and switching to 
CFL bulbs. It is not clear whether they will continue to undertake these steps for 
conserving energy in the future.  
 
2.2 Adaptation Actions    
The Lowland family recently moved to a home on the shores of the Mississippi River and 
is considering whether to invest $1,200 in flood-proofing their home so it is less 
susceptible to water damage from future flooding. Hydrologists have estimated that the 
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annual chance of a severe flood affecting their home is 1/100. Should such a disaster 
occur, the reduction in damage from flood proofing the home is expected to be $40,000. 
The Lowland family does not believe that it is worth incurring the cost to flood-proof 
their home since they perceive the risk of flooding to be below their threshold level of 
concern even with the possibility of sea level rise due to climate change. They see other 
ways of spending the $1,200 investment cost and believe that if they suffer severe 
damage to their property and contents, the federal government will bail them out with 
grants and very low interest loans.  
The Waterton family in Cornwall, UK experienced several incidents of flooding 
from major rainfall and storms that caused damage to their home and others in the 
community due to runoffs that exceeded the capacity of drainage infrastructure.  Because 
of these recent events, they have decided to invest in flood adaptation measures to protect 
themselves again future losses.  
 
2.3 Comparisons 
The Watt and Lowland families are reluctant to incur the costs associated with investing 
in adaptive measures for the following reasons:  
 They believe that climate change will not impact them in the near future. 
 The impact of the immediate upfront costs of undertaking these investments will 
impact on other expenditures given budget constraints.  
The Winter and Waterton families are interested in taking steps to reduce their energy 
consumption and protect themselves against flooding, for the following reasons:  
 The respective incidents in Juneau and Cornwall make the potential impacts of 
climate change salient to them. 
 They focus on the immediate potential benefits from investing in these measures.  
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3.  Intuitive and Deliberative Thinking 
Daniel Kahneman in his Nobel address (2003) and book Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011) 
characterizes two modes of thinking as “System 1” and “System 2” by building on a large 
body of cognitive psychology and behavioral decision research. The intuitive System 1 
operates automatically and quickly with little or no effort and no sense of voluntary 
control. It uses simple associations (including emotional reactions) that have been 
acquired from personal experience with events and their consequences. The deliberative 
System 2 initiates and executes effortful and intentional mental operations as needed, 
including simple or complex computations or formal logic. 
Many of the decision rules that characterize human judgment and choice under 
uncertainty utilize intuitive (System 1) processes that take advantage of past personal 
experiences, with their emotional reactions and other associations. Such shortcuts require 
less time and effort than a systematic analysis of the trade-offs between choice options 
and often lead to reasonable outcomes. If one takes into account the constraints on time, 
attention, and processing-capacity of decision makers, reliance on these intuitive decision 
processes may be the best we can do left to our own devices for many choices under 
uncertainty (Simon 1957). 
Intuitive processes work well when decision makers have copious data on the 
outcomes of different decisions and recent experience is a meaningful guide for the 
future, as would be the case in stationary environments (Weber 2006). These processes 
do not work well, however, for low-probability high-consequence events for which the 
decision maker has limited or no past experience by definition. In such situations, 
reliance on intuitive processes for making decisions will most likely lead to focusing on 
the recent past and thus maintaining the status quo (Hertwig et al. 2004). This suggests 
that intuitive decisions are problematic in dealing with mitigation and adaption measures 
such as investing in solar energy or protecting one’s house against future flood damage. 
The methodologies that characterize deliberative (System 2) thinking require 
stakeholders to make choices in a more systematic manner. Deliberative processing 
focuses on all potential short- and long-term consequences and their likelihoods, and 
evaluates the options under consideration. Deliberative decisions are described by formal 
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models where the optimal choice is made by individuals using criteria such as 
maximizing expected utility or by governments using the criterion of maximizing net 
present value.  A challenge facing policy makers is to develop strategies that are based on 
formal models while recognizing the biases and simplified decision rules that 
characterize intuitive thinking.   
 
3.1  Evaluating Adaptation and Mitigation Decisions Using Deliberative Thinking 
It is instructive to evaluate the decisions by the two families in our examples in Section 2 
who failed to take protective action. Deliberative thinking using a discounted expected 
utility [E(U)] model would have advised them to invest in these measures.  Consider the 
Lowland family who was debating whether to invest in flood-proofing measures that will 
cost them $1,200 but promised to reduce their losses by $40,000 if a flood with an annual 
probability of p = 1/100 occurred. If the family’s wealth is currently W and they plan to 
live in the house for the next T years, the discounted E(U) of investing and not investing 
in flood-proofing is given by: 
 
where  β =the annual discount rate, which is assumed to be constant over time. 
If the Lowland family were risk neutral (i.e., if they perceived the costs and 
benefits of the two actions proportionally to their actual dollar values), and had accurate 
information on the probabilities, costs, and expected benefits from investing in flood-
proofing measures, they would choose to incur the $1,200 even with a relatively high 
value β =.10 if they planned to live in their house for three or more years.4  They would 
still find this measure financially attractive even if they intended to move in the next 
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 Since W is irrelevant when a person is risk neutral, the expected discounted benefits from investing in 
flood proofing when β=.10 is   
 
which exceeds $1,200 when  T>3. 
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couple of years if the property value of their home reflected the reduced losses in the 
future from their flood-proofing investment.  If the family was risk averse and/or  β < .10, 
they would find this adaptation measure even more attractive.  
The Watt family would undertake a similar calculation to determine whether to 
invest $15,000 in solar energy panels that would result in a reduction in their average 
annual energy bill of between $3,000 and $6,000 over their current system. Consider the 
case where the family’s wealth is W and their annual current annual electricity bill is 
$10,000 per year. Suppose they would save only $3,000 per year if they invested in solar 
energy and that their electricity bills would be constant over the next T years. Then their 
decision on whether to invest would be determined by comparing the following two 
options and choosing the one which had the highest discounted E(U): 
 
If the Watt family planned to live in their house for only T<5 years, then the solar 
panel investment would not be worthwhile if the family was risk neutral, unless the 
property value increased significantly to reflect the savings in energy costs from this 
investment.  If the annual savings from investing in solar panels exceeded $3,000 then the 
investment would be financially attractive for values of T <5 years.  
 
3.2  Evaluating Adaptation and Mitigation Decisions Using Intuitive Thinking  
In designing mitigation and adaptation measures to reduce climate change risks, it is 
important to recognize the role that intuitive thinking plays in individuals’ decision 
making processes.  This section examines how risk perception and behavioral responses 
are guided by intuitive thinking. In this context, we highlight the role that past experience 
plays in the decision making process and its relevance to actions taken by the four 
families discussed in Section 2.  
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Perception of Climate Change Risks and Uncertainties 
Public perception of the risks of climate change differs from expert estimates 
(Weber and Stern 2011). There has also been an increasing awareness of climate change 
as an uncertain phenomenon by the public and a growing realization that technological 
solutions and human responses have their own set of uncertainties (Patt and Weber, 
2013). 
Psychometric studies in many countries have shown that two dimensions 
influence people’s intuitive perceptions of health and safety risks (Slovic 1987). The first 
factor, dread, captures emotional reactions to hazards like nuclear reactor accidents, or 
nerve gas accidents. Such hazards trigger people’s automatic fear responses, often 
because of a perceived lack of control over exposure to the risks and because the 
consequences are perceived to be catastrophic.  The second factor, unknowability, refers 
to the degree to which a risk (e.g., DNA technology) is perceived as scary because it is 
new, with unforeseeable consequences and with exposures not easily detectable. Both 
these reactions characterize perceptions of risk as more a feeling than a statistical concept 
(Peters and Slovic 2000; Loewenstein et al. 2001).  
Intuitive perceptions of risk can lead to systematic deviations from expert 
assessments for risks that involve small probabilities and high degrees of uncertainty that 
do not trigger feelings of dread.  Risks associated with climate change have these 
characteristics: their likelihood of adverse consequences is small and uncertain and they 
do not elicit strong fears in most people because they are abstract and have not been 
experienced personally (Weber 2006). To illustrate this point, consider the Lowland 
family. For them, the likelihood and consequences of a flood are abstract because they 
have never experienced a loss. In fact, they consider the chances of a flood causing 
damage to their home to be below their threshold level of concern. 
Laypersons think about climate change in ways different than do climate 
scientists, including the use of different mental models (Kempton 1991; Bostrom et al. 
1994).  Many laypeople do not differentiate between climate and weather, and consider 
themselves experts on the weather. Hence, the risks associated with climate change are 
not viewed as new or uncontrollable (Bostrom et al. 1994; Cullen 2010).  People feel that 
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they have control over typical inclement weather by taking an umbrella to protect against 
rain, or by changing the location and timing of a planned outdoor wedding. 
 When climate change first emerged as a policy issue, people often confused it 
with the loss of stratospheric ozone resulting from releases of chlorofluorocarbon. As the 
“hole in the ozone layer” issue has receded from public attention, this confusion has 
become less prevalent (Reynolds et al. 2010).  Today, greenhouse gases are often 
wrongly equated with more familiar forms of pollution, such as sulfur dioxide. People 
thus make the incorrect inference that “the air will clear” soon after emissions are 
reduced (Sterman and Sweeney 2007) when, in fact, most greenhouse gases continue to 
warm the planet for decades or centuries after they are emitted (Solomon et al. 2009).  
This leads individuals to underestimate the need for immediate action, which may 
contribute to why the Watt family decided not to invest in solar panels.  
Behavioral Responses to Losses and Delayed Consequences  
There are several other features of information processing that lead households 
such as the Watt and Lowland families to decide not to invest in adaptation and 
mitigation measures. Prospect theory formalizes the systematic observation that an 
outcome perceived as a loss relative to the status quo or other reference point is given 
greater weight than the same outcome perceived as a gain, a regularity labeled as loss 
aversion (Tversky and Kahneman 1991). In other words, people are much more averse to 
perceived costs than to foregone benefits. The upfront and certain costs of the solar 
panels and flood protection thus loom large for the Watt and Lowland families, much 
more prominently than the potential benefits of these investments down the road.
5
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 Loss aversion should motivate more action than would be undertaken using formal models of 
choice such as discounted expected utility theory. Climate change is typically framed as the loss of climate-
conditions that are conducive to human habitation on planet earth or more concretely as the loss of features 
(e.g., glaciers or coral reefs) or species (e.g., polar bears) that are highly valued by many people.  This 
insight is being used by organizations like the Natural Resources Defense Council and the World Wildlife 
Fund that attempt to trigger loss aversion in their solicitations for charitable donations with images of 
doomed species (e.g., https://www.nrdcgreengifts.org/den-defender?s_src=CKGG-NRDC-GG-A02-S.DD-GG-
SE-SE-US-PLR-BO-ALL-Z00, 
http://www.arctichome.com/showLBE.do?id=arcticHome&type=pillar&size=3&exp=html&).  However, the 
effect of loss aversion to motivate actions is often counteracted by other factors. For example, most people 
do not find the threat of such losses credible, given that it is based on scientific predictions that are abstract 
and temporally distant rather than being personal and imminent (Weber, 2006).  
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An additional explanation as to why individuals fail to invest in adaptation and 
mitigation measures in the face of transparent risks are budget constraints as illustrated 
by the Lowland and Watt families’ unwillingness to incur the upfront costs of flood-
proofing and solar panels, respectively. Some budget constraints reflect financial reality, 
whereas others are psychological. Individuals tend to set up separate mental accounts for 
different classes of expenditures that serve as effective budgeting and self-control devices 
for decision makers with limited processing capacity and self-control (Thaler 1999).  
Human temporal discounting tends to be quasi-hyperbolic, where outcome 
valuations fall very rapidly for even small delay periods (Laibson 1997).  Observed 
discount rates from controlled experiments and field studies tend to be much larger than 
commercial interest rates (Frederick et al. 2002).  This is yet another reason why the 
immediate upfront costs of mitigation and adaptation measures loom disproportionately 
large relative to their delayed expected benefits during the life of the property. 
Another extreme form of discounting is myopic behavior where the decision 
maker focuses only on the potential benefits of an investment over the next T periods 
(Kunreuther, Meyer and Michel-Kerjan 2013). If the decision makers’ time horizon is 
only two or three years, then they will underweight the expected benefits of the 
investment when compared to a formal models of choice such as discounted expected 
utility theory that extends indefinitely into the future.  
Role of Past Experience  
The evidence is mixed on whether individuals learn from past experience with 
respect to investing in adaptation or mitigation measures that are likely to be cost-
effective. Even after the devastating 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons in the U.S., a large 
number of residents in high-risk areas had still not invested in relatively inexpensive loss-
reduction measures, nor had they undertaken emergency preparedness measures 
(Goodnough 2006).  This behavior contrasts with residents in Cornwall, UK who became 
concerned with climate change and were more open to undertaking mitigation and 
adaptation measures, perhaps because the local media linked the increase in rainfall 
intensity and flood risk to global warming (Spence et al. 2011).  
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The Waterton family’s investment in adaptation measures for dealing with the 
flood risk is similar to the decision by residents in California to buy earthquake insurance 
voluntarily following the 1989 Loma Prieta quake and the 1994 Northridge quake.  In 
contrast to homeowners’ insurance, earthquake coverage is not required as a condition for 
a mortgage, even in actively seismic states such as California.  In the 1970s, less than 10 
percent of the homes were insured against earthquake damage. By 1995, over 40 percent 
of the homes in many areas along the coast were insured against this risk (Palm 1995).  
There have been no severe earthquakes since 1985 and the percentage of residents that 
have earthquake insurance in 2012 has dropped back to 12 percent.  
With regard to energy efficiency measures, there is empirical evidence that people 
develop energy-conservation habits when forced to take temporary measures in response 
to a power shortage or other disruption. The Winter family and other residents of Juneau, 
Alaska subsisted on a fraction of their previous energy budget for an extended period of 
time due to severed power lines. Response to this electricity “crisis” included electricity 
conservation that began within two days of the event and reduced electricity use by 25 
percent over the period of supply disruption relative to the same period in 2007.  After 
the transmission line was repaired and electricity rates returned to normal, electricity use 
increased but was still 8 percent below the usage during 2007 (Leighty and Meier 2010).   
A second avalanche on January 9, 2009 damaged the same section of transmission 
line and caused a second supply disruption, albeit shorter in duration (19 vs. 45 days) and 
magnitude of price increase (200 vs. 500 percent). This time, energy usage during the 
disruption period decreased by 12 percent relative to the same period in 2007 and 
increased slightly (2 percent) after the disruption was over and prices went back to 
normal. Energy consumption over the next year was down 10 percent compared to the 
baseline in 2007 (Leighty and Meier 2010). 
With respect to investment in solar technology, households such as the Watt 
family will be reluctant to incur the investment because of its high initial costs.  
Households like the Winter family are willing to incur the costs or inconvenience of 
curtailing their use of electricity following power shortages, in part because the financial 
savings are great during the emergency period, but also because new habits may get 
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established during that period and the experienced costs or inconveniences of such 
curtailments may turn out to be not as large as anticipated. 
 
4. Strategies for Addressing Climate Change 
This section discusses how choice architecture as well as short-term economic incentives 
can affect individual choices with regard to energy efficiency and flood reduction.   
 
4.1 Choice Architecture and Economic Incentives 
Choice architecture, a term coined by Thaler and Sunstein (2008), indicates that people’s 
choices often depend in part on how possible outcomes of different choice options are 
framed and presented. Framing typically refers to the way in which outcomes are 
described as gains or losses relative to a reference point, which can either be the status 
quo or another value.  Choice architects can influence decisions by varying the reference 
point, the order in which alternatives and/or their attributes are presented, and can set one 
choice option as the no-choice default (see Johnson et al. 2012).  
 Most choice architecture interventions have focused on decisions where the 
outcomes are known with certainty or where there is a time delay. Adaptation and 
mitigation decisions with respect to climate change involve decisions under risk and 
uncertainty that require one to focus on the likelihood with which specific events might 
occur. An event with an extremely small likelihood and an outcome that does not elicit a 
strong affective reaction will tend to be ignored (i.e., treated as if it will not happen). 
Potential disasters attributed to climate change (such as flood damage from sea level rise) 
will tend to fall into this latter category, when described as statistical phenomena.  
Economic incentives may complement choice architecture to increase the value of 
adaptation and mitigation investments that can reduce adverse climate change impacts. 
Long-term loans can spread the upfront costs over time, as a way to diminish individuals’ 
real or psychological budget constraints. If the annual savings in the energy expenses 
from investing in solar energy are greater than the annual loan payments, adopting this 
technology will be financially attractive to homeowners. Similarly, if the annual loan 
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payment for floodproofing one’s home is less than the premiums for flood insurance due 
to lower expected claims payments, then it is a financially attractive adaptation measure.  
 
4.2 Encouraging Reduction of Energy Use 
Dietz et al. (2013) notes that describing options in a way that overcomes individuals’ 
reluctance to incur the upfront costs associated with the proposed measure can encourage 
households to adopt energy efficient measures or invest in new energy technologies. For 
example, choice architecture can be applied to the decision facing the Watt family with 
respect to installing solar panels in their house.  
Framing the Problem 
It is important to recognize  that different subsets of individuals may be receptive 
to different messages when considering energy efficient measures. Recent research has 
indicated the effectiveness of highlighting indirect and direct benefits (e.g., being 
“green,” energy independence, saving money) in people’s adoption of energy efficiency 
measures to address the broad range and heterogeneity in people’s goals and values that 
contribute to the subjective utility of different courses of action (Jakob 2006).  The fact 
that many of these co-benefits are more immediate also helps in light of the hyperbolic 
discounting of delayed benefits. A crisis like the Juneau, Alaska, power outage is an 
example, making energy scarce and sending a strong price signal for conservation. 
The importance of political identity considerations also plays a role, as different 
constituencies have different associations to choice options. More specifically, promoting 
the environment can negatively affect adoption of energy efficiency due to the political 
polarization surrounding environmental issues. A study by Gromet et al. (2013) revealed 
that more politically conservative individuals were less likely to purchase a more 
expensive energy-efficient light bulb when it was labeled with an environmental message 
than when it was unlabeled.  An earlier related study by Hardisty et al. (2010) showed 
that a label for a carbon fee to which most people have positive associations (i.e., “carbon 
offset” which allows for guilt-free air travel) increases consideration and purchase of the 
fee, whereas a label with a negative associations (i.e., “carbon tax,” which has strong 
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negative associations among conservative respondents) has the opposite effect, holding 
material costs and benefits constant. 
Using Choice Defaults 
Making one choice alternative the default option so that it will be in place if no 
other option is actively chosen has been shown to be effective by a wide range of lab 
studies (e.g., Johnson et al. 2007; Weber et al., 2007) and evidence from the field ranging 
from insurance decisions (Johnson et al. 1993) to organ donation (Johnson and Goldstein 
2003). Economists (Choi et al. 2003) and psychologists (Weber and Johnson, 2009) agree 
that multiple reasons contribute to this effect, including decision makers’ inertia, implied 
endorsement of the default option, and the tendency to process this option earlier and 
more favorably than other alternatives (Johnson et al. 2007, Weber et al. 2007).  
Heterogeneity in decision makers’ preferences and circumstances present a 
challenge in selecting defaults since there may not be one option that would increase 
every person’s welfare if it were the one chosen. Goldstein et al. 2008 has addressed this 
issue by exploring the use of smart defaults, i.e., customized default options in response 
to a consumer’s answers to a small number of diagnostic questions.   
 Energy-efficient and green-energy choice options can be presented to households 
in a variety of ways that increase their likelihood of being selected.  One way is to list the 
energy-efficient appliances at the top of a list of products in a given category, or to 
provide lists or matrices of products presorted by energy efficiency rather than by 
manufacturer or by price (Johnson et al. 2012).  Making energy-efficient products or 
technology the no-choice default, for example in building codes, is another way to 
increase uptake of such technology. The choice of CFL bulbs increased from 56 percent 
to 80 percent when CFL bulbs were provided as the no-choice lighting default in a house 
renovation rather than incandescent bulbs (Dinner et al. 2011). This still gives decision 
makers choice autonomy should they want to override the specified default.   
The same behavior has been observed when choosing between different providers 
of electricity. For example, making green energy (rather than conventional carbon-
generated energy) the default option resulted in a very large percentage of German utility 
customers accepting and staying with this option even when feedback about its higher 
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costs was experienced for several months after the intervention (Pichert and 
Katsikopoulus 2008).
6
 
Structuring Economic Incentives  
Given that households are unlikely to choose energy-efficient technology in the 
absence of short-term economic incentives, solar companies that are trying to expand 
their market might consider paying the upfront cost of the panels so there would be no 
initial expenditure by the Watt family. The company would then issue a loan tied to the 
mortgage, so that the cost of the solar panels will be repaid over the next fifteen, twenty 
or thirty years by the property owner. Solar companies in California such as Stellar Solar 
have a program similar to this one (http://www.stellarsolar.net/residential-solar-panel-
installation-san-diego.html).  
The company would also provide accurate information to households on their 
annual savings relative to what their energy bill would have been without solar panels, 
either after the household signed up or before, telling them about the savings they are 
currently missing. These homeowners could then compare these savings with their annual 
loan payments to the solar company, because the two amounts are being provided in a 
comparable metric (i.e., annual amount).  The solar company could also guarantee that 
the monthly annual loan costs would always be lower than the savings in energy costs, 
thus creating solar investment as a dominating alternative.  Portions of the loan payments 
could be deferred to the next month or the loan extended, so the household would be 
guaranteed to save money each month (Montgomery 1989).  
Establishing Social Norms  
Individuals’ and households’ decisions about energy use are sensitive to choice 
architecture. For example, the company OPOWER has been highly successful in 
encouraging energy efficiency by issuing reports that compare households’ energy usage 
among neighbors with similarly-sized houses and also include targeted tips for 
                                                        
6
 From a social welfare perspective it may be appropriate to make green energy the default option only if 
the estimated cost of carbon is sufficiently high.  Borenstein (2012) calculated that residential solar would 
be cost competitive only on a social cost basis in the USA, if the cost of carbon dioxide emissions were 
greater than $316 per ton. 
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households to lower their energy consumption to the "normal" neighborhood rate. Using 
data from a randomized natural field experiment of 600,000 households, Allcott (2011) 
estimates that OPOWER’s Home Energy Report letters to residential utility customers 
that provide descriptive norms by comparing their electricity use to that of their 
neighbors reduce energy consumption by 2.0 percent, with a 6.3 percent reduction for the 
highest use decile and a 0.3 percent reduction for the lowest decile. These non-price 
intervention effects are equivalent to that of a short-run electricity price increase of 11 to 
20 percent, and their cost effectiveness compares favorably to that of traditional energy 
conservation programs.
7
  
Following a social norm can be seen as a specific decision simplification that 
substitutes a rule (“I do what similar others do”) for any implicit or explicit calculation of 
costs and benefits (Weber and Lindemann 2007).  Such rules and social-role related 
obligations are often acquired through observational learning and imitation.  Copying the 
observed behavior of others is a widespread phenomenon of which the imitator is 
typically unaware and plays a large role in human development (Meltzoff and Moore 
1999).   
If social norms are established that lead to greater use of energy efficient 
technology at the household level, this effect will cross to a more macro level by 
encouraging manufacturers to invest into the R&D of such technology and by 
encouraging public sector actions such as well-enforced standards of energy efficiency as 
part of building sale requirements as have been practiced in Davis, CA for thirty years 
(Dietz et al. 2013). 
 
4.3 Adaptation Measures for Flood Reduction  
 
A combination of choice architecture measures and short-term economic incentives may 
lead individuals and households to invest in flood adaptation measures. 
                                                        
7
 Allcott points out that there is an unambiguous gain in consumer welfare from the OPOWER program if 
the treatments affect energy use by improving information or facilitating social learning about privately-
optimal levels of energy use. If on the other hand, the treatments affect only the moral utility of energy use 
(i.e., happy feeling when reducing energy use and contributing to a public good such as reduced GHG 
emissions, or guilt when increasing energy use), then it is not clear whether they are consumer-welfare 
enhancing. 
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Framing the Problem 
Research reveals that people are willing to pay considerably more to reduce the 
risk of adverse events if the likelihood of the event is taken seriously rather than being 
viewed as below one’s threshold level of concern. One way to do this is to use a longer 
time horizon for estimating the probability of an event. People are more willing to wear 
seat belts if they are told they have a cumulative .33 chance of a serious car accident over 
a fifty-year lifetime of driving rather than a .00001 chance each trip (Slovic et al. 1978). 
Property owners are far more likely to take flood risk seriously if they are told the chance 
of at least one flood during a 25-year period is 1 in 5 rather than the comparable annual 
probability of 1 in 100 (Weinstein et al. 1996). Such information provision programs 
could be supported by insurers and real estate brokers (programs targeted to their clients) 
and local, state and federal governments.  
One can also focus on the benefits of protection against specific events rather than 
on a generic class of events.  Controlled experiments years before the terrorist attacks of 
9/11 revealed that consumers are willing to pay more for insurance against a plane crash 
only caused by terrorists than for a crash due to any cause (Johnson et al. 1993).  This 
finding suggests that citing the benefits of protecting oneself against another hurricane 
such as Sandy might be more successful in attracting interest than a message framed 
merely in terms of reducing future flood damage. 
Structuring Economic Incentives  
Coupling home improvement loans with flood insurance could provide economic 
incentives for homeowners to engage in flood damage prevention. Similar to the choice 
architecture for encouraging adoption of solar energy, long-term home improvement 
loans could spread the cost of the adaptation measure over a period of years, which would 
diminish consumers’ reluctance to invest in adaptation measures caused by a focus on 
short-term horizons and hyperbolic discounting (Kunreuther, Meyer and Michel-Kerjan 
2013).  Homeowners who invested in adaptation measures would be given an insurance 
premium discount to reflect the reduction in expected losses from floods.  
To illustrate how the Lowlands could employ such a program, consider the 
example presented in Section 2 illustrating the outcomes of investing in flood adaptation 
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if the family utilized expected utility theory in making their decisions.  If flood insurance 
premiums reflected risk, the reduction in the annual insurance premium would be $400 
[i.e., .01($40,000)]. The adaptation measure costs $1,200, but with a five-year home 
improvement loan at an annual interest rate of 10 percent, the yearly loan payment will be 
only $295.  The Lowlands would thus save $105 each year by adopting this measure, 
presumably making it an attractive alternative.  
The home improvement loan and a multi-year flood insurance policy could be tied 
to the property rather than to the homeowner. This measure would avoid cancellations of 
insurance, as happens with flood insurance when individuals have not experienced 
damage for several years.
8
 Homeowners even allow their flood insurance to lapse when 
they are required to purchase flood insurance as a condition for a federally insured 
mortgage. Some banks and financial institutions have not enforced this regulation, 
possibly because mortgages are transferred to financial institutions in non-flood prone 
regions of the country that are not aware of either the flood hazard risk or the requirement 
that homeowners may have to purchase this coverage (Michel-Kerjan et al. 2012).   
 
5. Conclusions and Future Research 
This paper highlights the importance of understanding individuals’ perception of risk and 
the heuristics they utilize in making choices as it affects their decisions to invest in cost-
effective adaptation and mitigation measures.  
Empirical research in psychology and behavioral economics provides a large body 
of evidence that people frequently engage in intuitive thinking that leads to decisions that 
differ from those implied by formal models such as expected utility theory. Recognizing 
these behavioral characteristics of individuals provides entry points for designing 
strategies, such as linking choice architecture measures with short-term economic 
incentives.  
                                                        
8
 See Kunreuther, Pauly and McMorrow (2013) for more details on the role that insurance can play to 
encourage investment in adaptation measures by utilizing formal models of choice while taking into 
account the features of intuitive thinking. 
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Future research could examine the impact that strategies encouraging individuals 
to invest in adaptation measures will have on social welfare, as this has important 
implications for government policy.  Another question is whether the public sector can 
influence decision making through subsidies, fines and tax incentives coupled with 
enforcement of building codes.  An examination of these policy tools in combination with 
choice architecture may provide the structure and components for developing a theory of 
behavioral welfare economics that addresses ways to increase individuals’ investments in 
mitigation and adaptation measures as it relates to climate change and other social 
problems.   
 21 
References 
Allcott, H. (2011). Social norms and energy conservation. Journal of Public Economics, 
95, no. 9: 1082-1095.  
Borenstein, S. (2012). The Private and Public Economics of Renewable Electricity 
Generation. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 26(1): 67-92. 
Bostrom, A., Morgan, M. G., Fischhoff, B., & Read, D. (1994). What do people know 
about global climate change? 1. Mental models. Risk Analysis, 14, 959-970. 
Choi, J. J., Laibson, D., Madrian B. C. & Metrick, A. (2003). Optimal defaults. 
Behavioral Economibs, Public Policy, and Paternalism, 93, 180-185.  
Creyts, J., Granade, H. C., & Ostrowski, K. J. (2010). U.S. energy savings: Opportunities 
and challenges. McKinsey Quarterly, January Issue. 
Cullen, H. (2010). The weather of the future: heat waves, extreme storms, and other 
scenes from a climate-changed planet. New York: Harper. 
Denholm, P., Margolis, R. M., Ong, S., & Roberts, B. (2009). Break-even cost for 
residential photovoltaics in the United States. Key drivers and sensitivities. National 
Renewable Energy Lab, Technical Report NREL/TP-6A2-46909. 
Dietz, T., Stern, P. C., & Weber, E. U. (2013). Reducing carbon-based energy 
consumption through changes in household behavior. Daedalus, 142, 1-12. 
Dinner, I., Johnson, E. J., Goldstein, D. G., & Liu, K. (2011). Partitioning default effects: 
Why people choose not to choose. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 17, 
no. 4 332. 
Drury, E., Jenkins, T., Jordan, D., & Margolis, R. (2013). Photovoltaic investment risk 
and uncertainty for residential customers. IEEE Journal of Photovoltaics. 
Frederick, S., Loewenstein, G., & O’Donoghue, T. (2002). Time discounting and time 
preference: A critical review. Journal of Economic Literature, 40, 351–401. 
Gately, D. (1980). Individual discount rates and the purchase and utilization of energy-
using durables: Comment. The Bell Journal of Economics, 11, 373-374.  
 22 
Goldstein, D.G., Johnson, E. J., Herrmann, A., & Heitman, M. (2008). Nudge your 
customer toward better choices. Harvard Business Review, December, 99-105. 
Goodnough, A. (2006). As hurricane season looms, state aim to scare. The New York 
Times, May 31.  
Gromet, D. M., Kunreuther, H., & Larrick, R. P. (2013). Political identity affects energy 
efficiency attitudes and choices. PNAS, vol. 110 | no. 23 9314–9319.  
Hardisty, D. J., Johnson, E. J., & Weber, E. U. (2010). A dirty word or a dirty world? 
Attribute framing, political affiliation, and query theory. Psychological Science, 21, 
no. 1 (2010): 86-92. doi: 10.1177/0956797609355572. 
Hausman, J. (1979). Individual Discount Rates and the Purchase and Utilization of 
Energy-Using Durables. The Bell Journal of Economics, 10, no. 1, 33-54. 
Hertwig, R., Barron, G., Weber, E. U., & Erev, I. (2004). Decisions from experience and 
the effect of rare events in risky choice. Psychological Science, 15, no. 8, 534-539. 
Hirst, E., & Brown, M. (1990). Closing the efficiency gap: barriers to the efficient use of 
energy. Resources, Conservation and Recycling, 3(4), 267-281. 
Jaffe, A. B., & Stavins, R. N. (1994). The energy-efficiency gap: What does it mean? 
Energy Policy, 22(10), 804-810. 
Jakob, M. (2006). Marginal costs and co-benefits of energy efficiency investments: The 
case of the Swiss residential sector. Energy Policy, 34, no. 2, 172-187. 
Johnson, E. J. & Goldstein, D. (2003). Do defaults save lives? Science, 302, 1338.  
Johnson, E. J., Häubl, G., & Keinan, A. (2007). Aspects of endowment: a query theory of 
value construction. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition 33, no. 3, 461-474. 
Johnson, E. J., Hershey, J., Meszaros, J., & Kunreuther, H. (1993). Framing, probability 
distortions, and insurance decisions. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 7, no. 1, 35-51. 
Johnson, E. J., Shu, S. B., Dellaert, B. C. G., Fox, C., Goldstein, D. G., Häubl, G., 
Larrick, R. P. et al. (2012). Beyond nudges: Tools of a choice architecture. 
Marketing Letters, 1-18. 
 23 
Kahneman, D. (2003). A psychological perspective on economics. The American 
Economic Review, 93, no. 2. 162-168. 
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 
Kempton, W. (1991). Public understanding of global warming. Society & Natural 
Resources 4, no. 4, 331-345. 
Kunreuther, H., Meyer, R. J., & Michel-Kerjan, E. (2013). Overcoming Decision Biases 
to Reduce Losses from Natural Catastrophes. In: E. Shafir (Ed.), Behavioral 
Foundations of Policy, Princeton University Press. 
Kunreuther, H., Pauly, M. V., & McMorrow, S. (2013). Insurance and Behavioral 
Economics: Improving Decisions in the Most Misunderstood Industry. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Laibson, D. (1997). Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 112, no. 2, 443-478. 
Leighty, W., & Meier, A. (2010). Short‐term Electricity Conservation in Juneau, Alaska: 
A Study of Household Activities. Proceedings of the 2010 Summer Study on Energy 
Efficiency in Buildings. Washington, DC: ACEEE, 
eec.ucdavis.edu/aceee/2010/data/papers/2131.pdf. 
Loewenstein, G. F., Weber, E. U., Hsee, C. K., & Welch, N. (2001). Risk as feelings. 
Psychological Bulletin, 127, no. 2: 267.–286. 
Meltzoff, M. A., & Moore. M. K. (1999). Persons and representation: Why infant 
imitation is important for theories of human development. In: J. Nadel and G. 
Butterworth, (Eds.), Imitation in Infancy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999.  
Meyer, E., Baker, J., Broad, K., Czajkowski, J., & Orlove, B. (2013). The Dynamics of 
Hurricane Risk Perception: Real-Time Evidence from the 2012 Atlantic Hurricane 
Season.  Wharton Risk Center Working Paper #2013-07.   
 24 
Michel‐Kerjan, E., Lemoyne de Forges, S., & Kunreuther, H. (2012).  Policy tenure 
under the U.S. National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). Risk Analysis, 32, no. 4 
(2012): 644-658. 
Mills, B. F., & Schleich, J. (2008). Why don’t households see the light? Explaining the 
diffusion of compact fluorescent lamps. Working paper sustainability and 
innovation, No, S1/2008, http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0011-n-84564. 
Montgomery, H. (1989). From cognition to action: The search for dominance in decision 
making. In: H. Montgomery & O. Svenson (Eds.), Process and Structure in Human 
Decision Making (pp. 23-49). New York: Wiley.  
Palm, R. (1995). Earthquake insurance: A longitudinal study of California homeowners. 
Westview Press. 
Patt, A., & Weber, E. U.  (2013). Perceiving and communicating climate change 
uncertainty.  WIREs: Climate Change. Doi 10.1002/wcc.259. 
Peters, E., & Slovic, P. (2000). The springs of action: Affective and analytical 
information processing in choice. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26, 
no. 12, 1465-1475. 
Pichert, D., & Katsikopoulos, K. V. (2008). Green defaults: Information presentation and 
pro-environmental behaviour. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 28, no. 1, 63-73. 
Reynolds, T. W., Bostrom, A., Read, D., & Morgan, M. G. (2010). Now what do people 
know about global climate change? Survey studies of educated laypeople. Risk 
Analysis, 30, no. 10, 1520-1538.  
Simon, H. (1957). Models of Man. New York, NY: John Wiley. 
Slovic, P. (1987). Perception of risk.  Science, 236, 280-285. 
Slovic, P., Fischhoff, B., & Lichtenstein, S. (1978). Accident probabilities and seat belt 
usage: A psychological perspective. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 10, 281-285. 
Solomon, S., Plattner, G.-K., Knutti, R., & Friedlingstein, P. (2009). Irreversible climate 
change due to carbon dioxide emissions. Proceedings of the national academy of 
sciences 106, no. 6, 1704-1709. 
 25 
Spence, A., Poortinga, W., Butler, C., & Pidgeon, N. F. (2011). Perceptions of climate 
change and willingness to save energy related to flood experience. Nature Climate 
Change, 1, no. 1, 46-49. 
Sterman, J. D., & Sweeney, L. B. (2007). Understanding public complacency about 
climate change: Adults’ mental models of climate change violate conservation of 
matter. Climatic Change, 80, no. 3 (2007): 213-238. 
Thaler, R. (1999). Mental accounting matters. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 
12, 183–206. 
Thaler, R., & Sunstein, C. (2008). Nudge: The gentle power of choice architecture. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1991). Loss aversion in riskless choice: A reference-
dependent model. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, no. 4, 1039-1061. 
Weber, E. U. (2006). Experience-based and description-based perceptions of long-term 
risk: Why global warming does not scare us (yet). Climatic Change, 77, no. 1, 103-
120. 
Weber, E., & Johnson, E. (2009). Mindful judgment and decision making. Annual Review 
of Psychology, 60, 53-85. 
Weber, E. U., Johnson, E. J., Milch, K., Chang, H., Brodscholl, J., & Goldstein, D.  
(2007). Asymmetric discounting in intertemporal choice: A query theory account. 
Psychological Science, 18, 516-523. 
Weber, E. U., & Lindemann, P. G. (2007). From intuition to analysis: Making decisions 
with our head, our heart, or by the book.  In: H. Plessner, C. Betsch & T. Betsch 
(Eds.), Intuition in judgment and decision making (pp. 191-208). Mahwah, NJ:  
Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Weber, E.U., & Stern, P. (2011). The American public’s understanding of climate 
change. American Psychologist, 66, 315-328. doi: 10.1037/a0023253. 
Weinstein, N. D., Kolb, K., & Goldstein, B. D. (1996). Using time intervals between 
expected events to communicate risk magnitudes. Risk Analysis, 16, no. 3: 305-308. 
 26 
 
